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On the present-day l:htlkun~ cvu(lictiug ucsires for self-dctcrminntion and for 
t ~:rngn iaion uf legitimate righ ts of the new states are confrunt<:u, which nlit!lH 
lead to new re-giunul frictil111~. The connicr 11n the terrilOry of former Yugosla-
via has affected a specific nttiru<lc-profiling uf the Balkuu stnte~ nnd rca)n· 
finm:d the existence of Rnlkan ~ecuriry communi!)', which makes it impossibk 
to view national security uu~itlc lhc aegional Ralkan framework. Osin!! various 
mean .. , each of the Dalkan states strives to O\'CrL'Ome the uf0i~1iuns l)lought 
about hy the latest Bulkan o isi~ ~nd n-eare conditions for strengthening ics na-
tional security. 
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The new arrangement of political po\'.--er on the international scene bas 
caused new disruptions on the regionnl level.l A certain ~Lability in top 
worlt.l politics and the absence of threars of a new world conftict turned 
into ever;tl l>ma ii-SL~Ie in~Lahil ilie!. \\hich complicate the situation in par-
ticular world regions. 
The region of former Yugoslavia is topping the list of such new re-
gions that are clearly charactcriJ.cd by all the features of crisis develop-
ment. Upon the disintegration of the former tate and the creation of 
new enlitk: . this region witnesses continued struggle for the completion of 
the self-de termination proce · · lhu~ making new ground for further insta-
bilities. Conflicting desires for self-determination and recognition of legiti-
mate right · for the new stales have brought about new concepts of a lib-
eral nnd realistic approach tO the conflict in the region of fo rmer Yugn-
I In fA ll 1992, one of lellding l·rench polilieians: Pierre llus~ncr, wrote U1at 
Europe wa~ ~Lepping into uew Middle Ages, which would for some mean flexibil-
ity and multif:acial forms of belonging and participation, while fur ulben; it would 
mean a new religious war and an overflow of armed gangs, bcggcn. and pirates; 
in other words • anarchy and cuo~tanl figh ting (Le Monde, November 6. 1992). 
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slavia.2 These concepts include both theoretical and practical premise!'> for 
a possible solution. 
Conflict has become almost a nnmutl situation in that part of Southe rn 
Europe and the Balhm" in which certain entities are o;ecking their na-
tional inte rest or possibilities of bare l>Urvival. Auempts to resolve the 
conflict3 • though steadily monitoring the catadysm of the m:w Balkan re-
la tions, arc shadccl by the conmct and continml ul> fighting, but are. never-
Lhcle.·ll., clearing the view of a possjhlc war conclusion. 
Therefore, wc might say tha t in spite of the changing face of the war 
ami ncw proposuls, plans and scenarios that have been offered as po. ~iblc 
solutions from outsiuc, huth processes are taking place simultiineously and 
are adding a sp ecific dynamics both to the loe<tl Balkan region-! and to 
the efforts of the international community to put a n end to the connict. 
When staring the o pennes.c; of both processes and their dependence on 
local and international factors, one should emphasize that any anal)"il> of 
the contlict bas been limited by the time and number nf contacts among 
different parties. Local processes are immediatcly and directly affecting in-
ternational protagonists, and on thc nt her band, internatio nal activity ha~ 
heen imprinted in the balmviour in those areas, which ~:un mHke an im-
pact on the dynamics and the scope of any partiwlttr crisis. 
Starting from this point it can he stated that the contlict is ~:urrently 
a t such a stage tltal e ither its weakening and a transition to gradual 
normaliL.ation of re la tions5 , or its further expansion c<m be expected 
(within certain irrational mm c.\ which have additjonal valut: in this area). 
whicb would be difficult to control considering the new partie-S and re-
gion!>. 
2 Oul of abundant e:osung literaturt! on lhe contl ict in fonnet Yugoslavia, we 
have selected the following: 
M. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia_· The Fhird BaJJ:an War, London, 1992: 
J. Gow, u gitimocy and Military. The }~ugus!BY rri<>is.- London.. 1992: H. 
Wiberg, IJMded States and DivJilcd NMinns as a Secwity Problem: The (~se of 
Yugoslavia. Kobcnhavn, 1992: P. Garde, Vic et mort de Ia Yugoshwic, Paris, 
1992; J. Zamet.icn, Tlu: Yugoslav O>nilict, London, 1992; R Vukadinovic, T1Jt~ 
Break up uf Yugo.r;/nvin: Threats aud Chullcnge.r;, The Ungue, 1992. 
3 Cb. Papasoli1 il,U, Libcrol Idealism Venus Rc:ulism: Yugnsl.1v Case. Alht.:us, 
1994. 
4 R Vuk:adirlo\·ic, La lin de Ia >'ugos/avic: ct 1/nsmhi/ire Balkanique> Paris, 
1992. 
5 Ch. Cviic. "An Awful Warning: The War in ex-Yugoslavia-, &lkan Forum, 
1994, 2, 3, p. 68. 
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Uearing in mind such complexitit:s as well as the dispt:rsive character 
of local and international detennjnants, the picture of the ongoing conflict 
can he divided into three level : 
the conflict between the Repuhlic of Croatia and rebel Serbs on 
Croatia's territory, creating a state of neither war nor peace. wruch has 
not been completed - at least in the area of Eastt:! rn Slavonia and 
that can be activated HI any time by either uu incident or by previously 
planned moves; 
- rhe war in the area of Bosnia and H erzegovina, wruch hall its own 
logic of armed conflict with ph a. es of varied intensil) and which i · prc<;-
ently being sell leu through the impk:mentation of Dayton peace <lgree-
menL; 
- a possible conflict in the '\outb of fom1er Yugoslavia (Kosovo and 
Macedonia). where new conditions leading to new large-scale Balkan con-
flicts, alongside with rhe invnlvement of other Balkan states and their 
statement of lhcir strategic and polilical goals, could be created (either by 
transferring or by initiating independent elements). 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia, besides numerous internal and inter-
national issues., !!hccJ a new tight on the problem of security on Lhe Bal-
kan!>. The ecurity system em the Balkans kept the halance between mem-
bers of the Warsaw Pact (Bulgnria, Romania) and the memhcrs of NATO 
(Greece, rurkey) for many years. Standing between these two political 
hines, a longside with AJhania, Yugoslavia acted as a non-bloc party wruch 
formed a )(pccific Balkan balance. Tl1c disilltegration of the Warsaw pact 
and Yugoslavia led to a political-strate.gic vacuum in the Balkan area Lim.<; 
creating cunuitions for establi hing new relations ·wirltin the Balkans and 
Europe. 
TI1e Balkan states r~ punc.Jed differently to the c..li~integration of Yugo-
slavia ancJ the ensuing conflict. Having traditionally goocJ relations with 
Serbia and due to it geographic po ·it ion, Romania was not hiding its 
C{mccm and readiness to help: Bulgaria was politie<tlly divided in its ac-
ceptance of the new Balkan re lutions; Greece attempted to Jdine clearly 
its national interest al. weU a its friendJv a ttitude to Serbia, while Alba-
nia greeted rhe dismtegration uf Yugoslavia with mo ·t enthusiasm, con-
vinced that the chances for the creation of new relauons on the Balkans 
as well as the solution of the Albanian problem finally became real. An-
nouncing ils big plan of nearly global action, Turkey estimated thnt the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia resulted in a new situation which itself npt:ued 
new possibilities for Turkey's much more intensive involvement on the 
llaJkans. 
The conflict in Lhe area of former Yugoslavia, its intensity and c>.pan-
sion, contirmed that the vacuum created on tht! Balkans would be of a 
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more permanent nature, ami cine to tha t each of tltc Balkan sta tes had 
to b uild their new strategies of Balkan !'elatinns witb utmost care. 
Alongside with the desire of each Balkan state, formt:r members of the 
Warsaw PacL, lu enter NATO as soon as po~"ihle, and the European 
Union a weU. the development of tht! Balkan relations became a perma-
nent factor which shoulu be taken into consideration. On one band n bas 
brought dynamjcs into their claims directed towards Europe, and on tlte 
other hand, it bas limitccl puSSJble poljtical action, redirect ing it in the 
ftrst place hack to the Balkan a rea. 
Thus, each of tbe Ba lkan states created the ir own approach to the 
cn sts in the an:a tlf former Yugoslavia, simultaneously trying to find pos-
sibililic;.-. for developing a new security system nationally and regionally, 
making way for entc ri11g the E uropean military-political and economic 
structure . 
R omtmia: between [fiend and mediator 
Bt:ing the b iggest state on the Balkan peninsula, despite ill complex 
internal economic and sodo-political problems, Romanitt carefully moni-
tored the development of the situa tion ensuing the disintegration of 
Yugml;wia from its very beginning, fearing that the conflict would expand. 
For l{omaruan diplomacy the biggest danger lay in the possible expansion 
of the t.:unnict ro Kosovo o r Macedonia, which would, undo ubtedly, hring 
ahout tbe mvolvement of the o ther llalkao states. AlrJmugh Romania was 
not directly included in the group of states which could take part in aity 
action, it W"tl aware of aU the d.i. ruptions and dangers tbat could emerge 
un the Balkan in regional proportions. 
Thert:forc, Romanian politics attempt ed to net as a media tor ht~ving 
good re la tions with aU the s tales in the a rea of formt: r Yugoslavia, not 
placing its friendly relations with Serbia first. Romanian politics never con-
cealed this traditional friendship, and it wa equa lly ready to help Se rbia 
in humanitarian matters as hcfure. The two socia ljst regime.-. on the Bal-
kans bad many upportunities for political contact~ too. However, R oma-
nian d iplomacy made contacts with Croaria and Bosnia-Hercegovina as 
well, trying to express i~ readiness for mediation. 
Emphasizing tha t Romania had 11eithc r any te rritorial claims fnr pt~rts 
of former Yugoslavia nor that the re were problems with JJ » tio naJ minori-
ties in Romania or Serbia, R omanian politics crc<t ted an appearance of 
objectiviLy in resolving the crisis. 
Showing fleXIbility in iL" global approach to the i. sues of strategic rela-
tions, Romanian po litics tried to crea te po~-.ibilities for wide action on dif-
ferent levels. Immedtalcly after accepting the Partnership fur Peace, Ro-
mania signed the Agreement of Military C..onpcration with Russia in an 
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attempt tu . how to the Russian side that cooperation with NATO ditl not 
at aU mean an end to its good relations with Mo~cuw. Also, implementing 
sanctions agamst Serbia, Rumania tried to use its political innucnce in or-
der to alleviate the sanctions. At the same.; Lirne together with other states 
affected by the implementation of sanctions R o mania uelll anded compen-
sa ticm from the UN, with no success. 
Knowing the Ralkun situation, the Romanian politics emphasized that 
thert! was no military olutiun and that foreign militmy inh:rvention in 
Bosnia wa counterproductive. Advocating any peaceful solution, Romania 
~eeks to prevem possible action by Balkan states military forces in the 
crisis area., believing that this could create severe and long-lasting effects 
on Balkan relation . At the same time, on several occasions Romanian 
p<llitit:S argued that the emhHgn is counterproductive as well anu that it 
cannot bear p<Jiitical results. This wa~ also based on the damages that 
Romania experienced due to the embargo policy. Romania estimated a di-
recl damage of $2 billion and an indirect damage- of more lhan $5 bil-
lion.6 
Aware of the inten iry nf possible disruptions on the Balkans, Romanja 
continue.-; tn support aU initiatives for a peaceful solution of the crisis in 
the area of former Yugoslavia. t\hhough Romania ha~ recently been la-
bclt:d as a 'Central European· \llile in official foretgn affairs terminology, 
tt ts quite d~;ar that Romanian politics c.1nnnt act smoothly in l::::.urope as 
long as the BaJkans rdatiorc. are not resolved. Striving for a development 
of peat:eful relations on the Balklln~, Rumanian politics seeks ground f<.1r 
its faster integmtiun into Europe and the creation uf new relations which 
would enable its prosperity. Combining friend ly remations with $~;rhia and 
the urlhotlox church and wishing to pave.; its way to a new European po· 
sition, Romania has become the first of the memher s tates of the former 
Warsaw Pact which signed the Agreement on the Partnership fur Peace 
with NATO, receiving assoetate memh~;r status in the Western European 
Union and "igning the Agreement on the associate status in the European 
Union. The Brussels announcement about Bulgaria aod Rom<tnia, bt!l ides 
rhe Vi~egrad four, becoming full memben; of the European Union clearly 
shows the main directiorL'\ that Romaruan politics hct taken. 
Bulgan~1: desire for a new sccurjLy rcg1inc 
Unlike Romania and its undivided pollticaJ atth ude to the disintegral'ion 
of Yugoslavia, Bulgarian politics (burdened hy inh:rnal political conflicts) 
was divided in the CTC}ttion of uniform policy. Officia l Sopbill acccpLed aJI 
UN and EU measures and supponed lhc embargo policy toward Serbia. 
6 Toge ther witb Ukraine and Russla. Rumania was among Lhe first countries 
that demandcll international compen aLion for damages caused by rhe implcmcn-
Laion of s~ocLions again~t Yugo~lavia. 
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However, unlike Romania's constant empbasis on oot having any territorial 
claims for parts of fom1er Yugo la\ria r1ur having problems related to mi-
norities, Bulgaria emerges as a wte directly interested in the disintegra-
tion nf Yugoslavia . 
Staniog from a firm sumdpuint defined as early as in 1953 that both 
Maccdonian nation and the Macedonian language are non-existen t, Bulgar-
ian politics renewed its allilutlc t<l so-c;11Jecl Western provinces 
(Macedonia) whid 1 Bulg:1ria g<lined in the St. Stefan Agreement. /\llhnugh 
one of the firs t countries to recognize Maceunn ia, Rulga ria clearly stated 
that it only n:cogni..:cd Lhc stHte, nnd not the nation, and that this issue: 
rcmuined to be solved at some time in the future . 
Offering assistance aud coupcration to the newly formed state, Bulgaria 
al. o immediately ·ought Macedon ian political forces with mo t l>imilar pn-
litical views and whose political program diu not conceal an aspiration for 
closer connection~ with Sophia. Ultr.~n:uionalist party VMRO bought arms 
in Sophia, which led to the faU of the then Bulgarian govcmment.1 Ln 
its atlempts tO develop cooperation, Soph ia does not give up on its denial 
of Macedonian natiun and language, thus creating an impression of transi-
tory relations which will sooner or later be replaced hy a different status 
of Macedonia. 
Taking into account both the historical ties 1111t.l politie<1 l activity of 
some of Macedon ian political forces which see Macedonia closely tied to 
Sopl1ia in the futu n.:, Bulgari;m politics is, nevertheless, extremely worried 
about the c..hmgen: Macedonia is facing, Working o f Allnmian forces which 
ever more clearly express their sect:. sinrnist tendencies and their wish to 
have stronger ties with Alhania, represent a serious threat not nuly f<.1r 
Maccdoni" but also for Balkan s tability. In cast: of rt.:newed conflicts and 
a need for military action. Bulgarian politics would not like to be driven 
into saving miJiLarily either Macedonia as a whole or those part" of Ma-
cedonia which could be auached with less difficulty. 
For Sophia, regard!~ of "bi<:h party or party coalition is in power in 
Skopje, it is e<c~ ier to develop pem1anent connection-; which strengthen 
Bulgarian influence and, through Mace<kmian political parties, to spread 
the belief that nne drty Macedonia could become part of Bulgari11, e ither 
in case of a more severe economic and social t:risis, or simply by majority 
vote. ln present circumstances Jirct:l military action, saving a part or the 
whole of Macedonia is not considered beneficia l for Bulgaria, whit:h has 
enough of its own difficu lties. Besides, the whole icleil of the so called in-
corporation of Macedonia is Ttnl rlanned to be realized at present. IL in-
volves a longcT period of time within which Bulgaria would become 
s tronger and when it would be much ca.-.'icr to incorporate Macedonia. 
7 Th~ EcoiWmist, Nu"-cmbcr 14. 1992. 
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A110ther problem re la ted t O Macedonia ami concerning .Uulgaria i~ 
Turki h politics. The politics <.lf the former socialist regime in Sophia was 
dearly a result of e~ !.~ntially good re lations hclween Bulgaria and Greece. 
Thi'> wus an answer to a pu ·!.ihle penetration of T urkey in this part of 
the .Ualkan . This alliance was a t the 'ame time supposed to create a 
pecial balance preventing broad~r T urkish action relative to Greece or 
Bulgaria. By the fall of sociali"m in Bulgaria, the new Bulgarian govern-
ment a t fi rs1 expressed llttle interest in coopera tion with G reece. Turkey, 
whos~.: capita l started enl ering Bulgaria, is making more and more use of 
the presence of its minori ty (almos1 a millio n people) and it i!. through 
their minority and in areiD. where the Turks repn;scnt the majority that it 
develops the ~trongest economic tiel. with Bulgaria. Presently, Turkey is 
one of the biggest foreign investors in Bul_g'.tria and numerous channel' 
have h~eu opened between thc'c two countries. 
However, reganlless of the posirive economic effects that have resulted 
from Turkish action, must political parties in Bulgaria have bee11 increas-
ingly fearing that such Turki:;h t1clion could go too fa r. The fact that 
T urkey bas a o;lrong presence in Macedonia is an additional rc l1Mm for 
Bulgaria's concern. Albanian ecessiontSt tendencies in Macedonia8 and 
Turki"h penetration mto Macedonia, which certainly has hruut.J potiticai-
Str.:lh:~gic and economic implications, are prc.-.ently slowing down rhe rcali-
ratinn of Bulgarian intention .. 
O n top of all this, Belgrade's attitude towards M acedonia is seeing it 
a.'\ a constituent part of lhe whole (of some new Yugoslavia) and as a 
direc1 geographic connection between Belgrade and friendly Athens. 
Bearing in mind ull this facts. B ulgarian politic.-. observing the crisis in 
the area in tormer Yugoslavia wouJd nm welcome any new deepenin~­
Economic damage caused by the emhr~r&ru is so huge that it can he ui-
rectly felt and SophiH coutinuous ly requires its lifting. The disintegration of 
Yugoslavia made way for the uxpansion of Bulgaria and cruation of new 
concepts of "Great St. Stefanian Bulg:.~ ria". However, there a re clear uh-
stacle.c: which Bulgaria a l present sta te of affairs is no t able to over-
comu.9 The breaking our of a conflict in Macedonia o r Kosuvo llterefore 
would not suit Bulgaria. which is still counting on long-term actions in 
terms of getting Macedonia dn. er to Bulgaria and on creating belief in 
the Macednnian majority that ophla i~ nuL only a natural a lly, hut <~l-.u 
a future solution to the ir problems. 
T ht! intensification of re lations wilh European institutions and t!ntering 
the Partnership for Peace as well as the announcement of a possible di~t-
8 D. M. P~:rry. ~une crise en gestation? La Macedonie et es voi ins", Puh-.. 
tique etrnngdre, J>aris, 1994, L p. 218-219. 
9 E. Tsenkov, "The Geopolitical Dilemmas of Former Satellite", Bulgamm 
Quarterly, Winter 1991. 
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cussion on Bulgaria's entrance to Lhc European Community, an: imposing 
certain limitations n:gardi:ng direct Bulgarian involvement in M acedonia. 
Greece ~~~ ll member of EU has hccn actively monitoring Bulgarian be-
haviour and any kind of aclic.m which would not be in Hccordance with 
the maintenance of the current situatkm in the south of the Balkan!., 
would be easily uSt:d again t Bulg<tria in the long proce of its ente ring 
NATO and EU.I0 
D eveloping cooperation with Skopje, struggling against auctions, and 
maintaining contact wilh Be lgrade (especially Bulgarian sc.lcialist fo rces), 
Bulgaria ha.'\ trongly opposed the participation of Ba lkan states in military 
UN forces in the area of former Yugoslavia. The inclusion of Turkish 
forces into UN lroops in llosnia was received wilh great endignation and 
was seen as adding fuel to the flames <tnd not as helping the peacefu l 
o lution of the crisi . 
Creating new re lations with Greece, Bulgarian politics is trying to re-
gain !he ir one-time significance, which would also weaken Turkey· intJu-
ence in Bulgaria. Balancing between big aspirotionJo. and limired possibili-
ties, Bulgarian politics remains a keen p<trlicipant, particularly in Mat.:edo-
nia, which understands all the dangers ~tnd challenges resuhing from any 
irrational poliLiCHI move or open crisis, which could lead to direct Bulgar-
ian aclilm. Various past connection~ wilh Serbia and the orthouox church, 
which is something the two countries share, did not lead to any firmer 
connectio ns between Sophia and Belgrade., hut they managed to maintain 
hasicaUy good neighbourly rela tion .11 Due to its keen inte rest in entering 
l:.urope, Bulgaria w<t'i motivated to act faicty, trying not to aggravate the 
alceady tlifficult situation on the Balkan .. 
Greece: tlicndship and common i.JJtcrcsts 
Greece, a country with a traditionally friend ly attitude tn Serbia and 
having a lot in common wit h Serbia (history. politic.tl ties, o rthodox relig-
ion, economic cooperation). has neve r crmcealed its inclination Lu Bel-
grade. Moreover, Greece used every political or diplomaJic opportunity to 
peak for Serbia and to support solutions which would be in favour of 
Belgrade e ither within EU, CSCE or the UN. On a pragmatic-political 
level this resulted in numcrou meetings of Milo~cvic and Mitsotakis and 
later Papandreu and <~lso in activities which were supposed to help find a 
sol ution to the crisis. Humanitarian aid to Serbin has kep~ coming from 
10 Some also hebeve that Bulgaria is very interested in crc111ting a so-C<llled 
buffer zone betweeu BuJgaria. • erbia, Albania and Greece. See: St. t\Ji:faotis, Bul-
gana: The /Jtlemm,1 o f a New Era, Athcn_, 1993, pp. 64-65. 
11 1'. Fileva., "'The Balkans: A Region l·rec of Regionalism .. , Bulganan Milttary 
Review, No. 2, 1994, pp. 15-16. 
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Orc:ece and the Greek Church, community and politictl organizations and 
groups of dtizens have alo;;u b~en ' 'l:!ry active. 
However, this multifacial Greek support o( Serhia <tnt.! all it . tood for. 
should not hecn accounted for solely by traditional fnendsbip or orthodox 
rehgion. It IS a combination of friend.,hip aml important Greek interests, 
which in this case correspond ~ith Serbian standpoints and activitie-... on 
the Dalkan in two major yucstion . 
The first refers to the new role of Turkey on the Balkans. Greece. 
which i ... almost obsessed with Turkey as a threat despite common mem-
bership in NATO, sees any Turki"h sl~p towards the Balkans as another 
evidence of Ankara's anti-Ureek politics and as an expre,,ion of the tie-
sire to create new great "Tu rkish bow" to encircle Greece. 12 Strengthen-
ing of Bulgaria - Tu(kish ties. strong Turkish position in Macedonia as 
well as the cslahlishrnent of speciol axis 1\nkara-Tirana is felt in Athens 
as an overt expression of Turkish a ll.cmpls ln cncircle Greece, to isolate 
it and to disrupt its development despite its membership in EU. Five cen-
turies of Turkish presence in tltc Balkans ore strong arguments and a 
warning to all who would like to h<IVe more int ense contacts will' Turkey. 
Ana ly.es which are attempting to show thar Turkey plans to re turn to the 
Balk<ms have been ~upport c::d in Belgrade as well. ln thar respect both 
countries, Serbia and Greece, ar e considered a" the chief llt.:ft:mlc::rs of 
Christianity in the Balkans, that are faced with a lack of understanding by 
the mternational community and that arc cxpo~eu to direct threats. 
Greek politics, almost completely convinced thar the Cyprus problem 
\\ill not he re'>olveu, fncing Turkish militruy force, seeks allies on one 
hand in ATO and Greek's position in the European Union, and un the 
other hand in Serbia, which is said to be confronted with the same en-
emy in Bosnia and in the broader Balkan ur~ (Sandlak, Kowvo). Com-
mon stand regarding Turkish threats is a solid ground of a common 
front, which has been developing for the last few years between Athens 
and Belgrude. 
Another issue about which Belgrade and Athens are exprcs_-.ing a high 
degree of agreement is the approach to Macedonja. I::.ven though after 
the Macedonian referendum the Yugu IHv army lrdt tin; n~.:wly established 
Mocedonian state without hesitation, Milosevi.c still holds that it is an ar-
tificial prmluct, which has n~.;ither good nor long-term prospects of normal 
existence. At the time. when Macedonia seemed to be close to an eco-
nomic collapse, a scenario for the acceptance of Macedonia in the so 
ca lled FR Yugoslavia had already heen LXlmplelcd in Bcl!,rrade. However, 
partly due to foreign assistance, partly due to profits made from breaking 
th ~; sanctions anti transporting goods into Yugoslavia, Macedonian economy 
12 J. Pattifur, -Greece into 1he Unlk:~n Crl!:i~ .. , Wnrld l'odoy, November 1992. 
Vol. 48 11. 
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has strengthened and is still maintaining its level. Thi" made clear even to 
Milosevic that Macedonia had to he con-;idered as an existing state which 
had not been n:cngni.,ed by Serbia, but which for him pmcd two identical 
problems: economic isolation and tile t!Xislcnce of hostile Albanian people. 
The c reatinn of M<~cetlorua as a stnte caught Greek polities unpre-
pared. lt was not able to use its European military-political and economic 
channels in order tn prepare for such an act, and the Macedonian accep-
tance of ~-ymbols, interpretation of history al> well ao; tatements that about 
250,000 Macedonians live in Greece were in Greece soon seen as Matx:· 
donian overt provocations. ~lacedonian Constiltution \\hich announced pos-
:-.ible protection of Macedonians living in neighbouring countnes (primarily 
in DuJgaria and Greece) cau. cd even more anguish in the Greek puhlic 
opinion. Athcns government was faced with home <.:Titicism which claimed 
that the government was cornpJetely unpr!.!pared for the creation of the 
new sta le on its bon.lcr" and that it did not do nnyth.i.ng to s lop further 
"Maccuonian provocations''. 1\s a reply to Lha l cri ticism, dreece initiated 
an embargo against MaccJonia, <~1 the same time closing the purt in 
Tbessalonica, which had been Macedonia's natural communication with the 
world, for all Macedonian goods. 
Within Lbe EUTope<m Union Greece s tarted a big e<tmpaign against the 
recognititm of Macedonia under thls name ancl these symbols, fe<:~ ring in 
fact some further development of relations on the Balkans. At:cnrt.ling to 
those fears, the newly created state rn.i~t find iLo;elf connected with forces 
hoJ..tilc tow<~rd Greece in the fui.t place Turkey. In that cas~, the l>Cl 
C<t lled minor issues of embh:~m . nHg, e tc. could be considered as a serious 
pretext leading to more complex relations. 
Although isolated within EU, where the Greek standpoint abou t the 
need not to recogni'l.c Macedonia was flnaUy abnm.loned, Greek politics 
still managetl to block any kind of EU's economic assistance to Macedo-
nia. Thus, Greece was faced with political isolation in EU. at the same 
time being rather u eccl sful in blocking Macedonia cconorniC<tlly by its ac-
tions. 
Since the long-last..ing anti-M:~cedonian action made the Greek public 
opinion accept the prem1se tha t the new state wants a part of Greek 
territory as far as The salonica13 and that therefore Greece shnult.l op-
pose it, the voices of some Greek politicians app~ling to reason and 
seeking cnmprnmise are not easily heard. A ll empts to create conditionJo 
for the recognition of Mncedcmi<J and the normalization of re la tions, are 
also obstructed by I he Macedonian side, where incidents onJy straighten 
IJ Albanian :.upporl of Macwnn.i.a. which was seen as a provoc.11ion of Serbia, 
irrilated Greece as well ami cuntnlmted a great deal to GrccL. politics toward!. 
Macedonia. See: J. Patiffe1 , WThe i'!cw Maccdoman Question•·. lot£>rnotiooal Af-
fllir.., Vol. 68, 2, Spring 1993, p. 270. 
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the positions of Greek nationalists. Claims that Greece .;huukl recognize 
Macedonia, solve by puliLical negotiation the questions of the preambule 
of the Macedonian Constitution, which can be interprctcll as an intrusion 
in the internal affairs of other state . and that Greece through its eL~I­
nomic actions might become i t more significant partner of Macedonia than 
Turkey i today, do not have any reflections in the Grec:k pol it i~l lt:ader-
ship. 
Con~idering Milosevic's non-recognition of Macedonia a~ an additional 
argument, Greek political circle are even more ready to persist in their 
standpoints. Squeezed by sanc1ions, which will be gradually lihed. Serbia 
ha.; a Jut in common with Ureece, which due to the Maccunnian issue 
brought itself into isohttion HI a political-diplomatic level. Having a very 
narrow perspective, both countries consider them ·elves deprived, think that 
there is a big int~;mational conspiJacy against them aod that they are 
both paying a high price clue tu 1 heir eonfrontmion with islamic forces. 
Th is was also the basis fo r rumours that even in the thty~ of the biggest 
pressure on Serbia, Miloscvi~ offered to create some confederation with 
Greece, which was denied by the Grcl!k side. Nevertheless, it was only 
one more proof of close positions the two states took in their isolated 
view of the: world and the AalkHn evcnL-.. 
The most recent tension betw~eo Athens and Tirana i · seen a." further 
proof of the hig conspirac:y. in Athens it bas been emphasized that Al-
banian politics gained sigoifiomt \Uppurl after Lbc military pact with Tur-
key, that large shipments of arms have been delivered ami that some 
Turkish consnltanL" work in Albania. In order to prepare the ground ei-
ther for possible actions against Serb in Kosovo or in Macedonia, Beri-
'\ha's regime started harassing Greeks in J\Jbania in order lO force them 
lO leave Albania. 1n that way the an::ca wnuld be cleansed and the 
chances for J\Jbanian military actions would be created, either in KustlVIJ 
or in Macct.lunia. Then Greece would have no reasons for intervention in 
case of a conflict since there wuult.l remain no Greek citizens in J\lbania. 
Even though this premise is rather far-fetched, it has it · supporter.; among 
some Greek politicians. 
/\II this creates solid enough grounds for maintaining Lite axis between 
Athcn~ and Belgrade, but at the same time, it does not allow Greece tu 
put an end to it ' tlipknnalic-political isolation soon. 
Albanian powciful rhctOiic 
The disintegration of former Yugoslavia was welcomed with overt satis-
faction in Albania, where the newly elected president Sali .1:3erisha stated 
that the formation of ·' new greHI Albania dncs nnl seem uoreaJ" in the 
so 
new circumstances.14 Decisive support to AI!JaniHn' in the area of fom1er 
Yugoslavia - in Kosovo and Macedunia - became a permaneu t tnlit of 
Uerisha's 1\lbauia. The declaration of indepeudeuce of Kw.;ovo, by which 
Albanian state of Kosovo was officially organi1cd, was reoognized by 1\1-
bania only, and n network of '·hodies" of the new Kosovo slate opcmtcs 
in Tirana. Simultaneously, Macedonia was asked to treat Albania as a 
constitue nt people. which wouJd enable them ro vore for their independ-
ence. That was in accordance with Rugova's requests atldrc sed to the 
Macedunian government reprding Albanian autonomy or the possibility of 
their union with Kosovo. In 1992 in one part of Macedonia Albanians es-
tahlishcd their republic " llliryda", which wa'i tu show their future direc-
tion.15 
Not concealing hi-; aspirations for creating a gr~;at Alhanja, Ilerisba t:'re-
qucnlly repeats that Albanian are one nf the very few nations of 7 mil-
lion people who live in five different sta tes. New Albania should direct irs 
efforts towarrno gelling Albamans to live in one -.tale and making condj-
Linns for crearing a single state. 
Despite this powerful nali(lnalist rhetoric, which seeh 10 create a great 
1\lbarua on the Balkans <lod which counts on huge numbers of compatri-
ots in other countries, Albania is still far from realizing such ideas. Being 
primariJy the poon.:sl country in Europe facing existential problems, 1\lba-
nia is •• country with permanent braindraining and political fighL-. between 
Berish a 's opponeolS anti followers. Albanian army, despite a certain degree 
of modernization, Turkish support and new armament is far from being 
able lo confront Milo~evic"s military and police forces in Ko two. Although 
Albanian army could threaten rbe small and ill-equipped Macedoniao 
army, one should not forget the extent nf possible consequences which 
might result from such a connicL, and the defini te involv~.;mcnt of other 
participants in the conflict with .1\Jbaniu. 
D espite CCrt(IID changes, the ruvision according ro tnl>al struCLUrl! i~ still 
dominating Albanian society nnd it is not likely that A lbaniR's Toski would 
simply welcome Kosovo ·s Gege, which are hctter educated, better-off and 
have more international experience because they lived in former Yugosla-
via. 
A country which is almost comple te ly dependent on international sup-
poTt, from food to arms, ha:-. to take these realities info account. The 
United ~tates ha. on several occasions malic dear that it counts on Al-
bania's rat ion:-~1 thinking and that a t this moment it is not intere~ted in 
npening a new fron t in the 'itmth of the Balkans. By including 1\lbnnia 
into the Partnership for Peace, a new framcwnrk of Albanian bebaviuuT 
14 R Austin, M\Vhat Albania Adds to the Balkan Stew". Orbis, Vol. 37, 2. 
Spring 1'.)93, p. 270. 
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was set, and even with powerful political rhetoric (whi.ch has its internal 
political purpose) 1\Jbania is not capable of doing all it would like to do 
towards the creation of a great Albania. 
1\ccordingly, Berisha' s stateme.nts have to be understood as a form of 
such limitcll behaviour, which has its own political reasons but wh ich, in 
reality, is far from bearing actual results. It is, of course, significant that 
Berisha gave his friends licenses for selling fuel to Serbia and Montene-
gro, at the time of stric1es1 intern:1ti.onal emhargo against the so a.tlled 
FR Yugoslavia. 
Albanian politics of avoitling confronta tion in Kosovo resuJted in Lbe 
existence. of two socio-political systems of education, medical care, univer-
sity, etc. As the Serbian system does not interfere with the 1\Jbanian, or 
vice versa, we cou lrl talk flhont "~mccessful" parallel existence of two sys· 
terns which are, of course, under surveillance of powerful Serbian police 
and military forces. 
Most Kosovo leaders feel that it is not the right time for starting any 
bip, actions and that, in present circumstance, any such attempts would be 
stopped. Support from outside AJhania could be expected only in terms of 
humanitarian aid, and a possible big exodus from Kosovo to 1\Jbania 
cnulll have disastrous effects on the alreaJy poor Albania. 
Rugova's claims that Albanians in Kosovo will win by patience could 
make sense.16 However, we should not forget certain weaknesses in po-
litical lcallcrship of i111kpendent Kosovo and MiJoseviC's attempts to get 
closer to a part of Albanian poHtic.ians by promising autonomy which 
would take place at the very moment when the conflict in Yugm:lavia is 
resolveci. It is <1lso very likely th<1t primarily young people wishing to emi-
grate and those dissatisfied with the too long wait mjght lose their pa-
tience which couJd lead to conflicts in either Kosovn or M aceLionia. 
Clearly, politics of restraint cannot last foreve r. There is not mucb 
time left for waiting for the possible weakening of Serbia and for starting 
an uprising. The intematinnal community is weiJ aware of those facts at 
times using the K + K formula, which would mean that giving autonomy to 
the Krajina Serbs would be followed by requests for autonomy by Yugo· 
slavia'a Albanians. Thi~ could also represent another solution for the 
status of Albanians in Macedonia. 
Unless the solution of Lhe status of Yugoslavia's Alhani1ms is not ap-
proached comprehensively, within the peaceful solution in the former state, 
it will remain an open issue, which could represent a perrn ant!nt Balkan 
sparkle. At UH:: same Lime, il might allow the formation of various a lli-
16 ll Stark, "La question albanaise'', Polirique etrangere, Vol. 59, Prinlemps 
1994, 1, p. 219. 
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ances, in which new relations could be built nn the basis of a referendum 
for or against .. Great Albania". 
Of coun;e, we should not forget the question of religion, which is be-
comin g more nnd more pmmrru;nl in tl1is a rea. Most 1\Jbanians frorn 
Kosovo and Macedonia a re Moslems. Togethe r with Bulgarian Moslems -
1 he Pomacs, Moslems from Sandzak and Moslems from Albania they form 
a powerful grnup. Balkan stt~tes, which have been closely monitoring the 
<.lcvclnpment of the relations in the south of the Ba lkan · see it as a 
permanen£ threat. which could ea ily k:ad to a new conflicL An explosion 
in Kosovo nnd Macedonia would start an avalanche of new relations in 
the entire area and it could lead to even more complex relations in the 
present conflict area in former Yugoslavia. 1f such a development is not 
stnppctl un time, it could become a pretext for the third Balkan war. We 
can only hope that .1\lbania will consider the dangers which it is being 
exposed to by its milil:mt rhetoric and that the inte rna tio11al community 
wi ll find a way to a peacefu l resolu tio n. 
Turld ~./J rcwrn Lu the Balknn. 
l"he fall of the socialist S) tem, particularly that in the USSR, as weJJ 
as the connict in I he! area of fom1er Yugoslavia, w<t' seen by ., urkey as 
an opportuntty for its own promotion on a broad international levd. A 
country which has latt:l)' heen develo ping its econom)' with a lot of suc-
cess, whm.c attempts to enter the European C' ..<1mmunity have failed, and 
which bas all the a ttributes of a regional power, saw in the nc:w t.:in:um-
stances a chance to acl in the area of former Sovict-Asian republics, in 
the Black Sc:t a rea and on the Balkans. 
According to Ozal who claim-; that the 21st century belongs to Turkey, 
Turkish politic:-. ha!i> taken a forceful economic initiative in As ia. competing 
with Tnm and Saudi Arabia for gaiuiug innuence in the newly estabfu hc:d 
tares. The cooperation in the Black Sea region should conlirm that Tur-
key is capable of acting towards bringing together lt ll the region's s tates 
''nile the Balkans and its conflicL-. hce<tme a testing range for powerful 
pouticakliplomatic action'>. 
Since the beginning of tbe connicl in Bosnia and H erzegovi11a most 
Turkish politicians have 1>cen Western actions as inadequate and thought 
that Mosh.:ms were tacitly sacrificed. Many have hecome aware tha t the;: 
West h<1s no intention of letli.ng Mo!'lems create a sta te i..u Europe and 
that by various divisiun1>, cantonizations and confcucratiun · it has a t-
tempted to deprive Moslems of their right Lo self-determination. 
Such circu ms tances in Turkt:y facilirared the development uf organized 
media activitie. . upportiog, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Soon after that Tur-
key emerged ru the ftr.t donator country in Bosnia. Alongl'illc with hu-
manitarian a id donations mcluded military '•upplit:-; for the Uosnian army 
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and significant financia l support has been provided as welJ as assistance in 
the Bosnian diplomatic mis:-.ions. 
in order to create a more powerful front which might u~al with the 
Serhs, president Ozal personaiJy saw to bringing closer Croatian, Macedo-
nian, Bosnian, 1\lbanian and Turkish standpoints, being convinced that it 
was th~se countrie:-; that wen: most exposed and most threatened 11nd that 
- witb the support of Turkey and some other countries - they could 
survive the conflict with Se-rbia. 
After the creation of Macedoniau state, Turkey offered safety guaran-
tees to it, and some tin1e later the agreement on military cooperation be-
twt-en Albania and Turkey wa.-; sihrnctl. On I he politiCl-ll level, significant 
efforts to weaken the connections between Bulgaria and Greece and to 
get Bulgaria to develop better relations with Turkey were made. That wa.'i 
<llso followed hy large Turkish investments mostly through BuJgarian Turks. 
1\s a result, a special safety regime limiting military forces was established 
between Turkey and Bulgaria. Tn Turkey this was seen as a success of 
Turkish poljticsP 
Monitoring the events in Kosovo and Sandzak, Ozal wamed Serbia on 
severa l occasions UJat what was going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina must 
never be repeated in this part of the BaJkans because the response 
(primariJy that of Turkey and 1\lbania) could be very uaugerous. 
As a member of the lslamjc Conference, Turky made a significant ef-
fort to provide permanent support was given to Bosoja and Herzegovina 
as welJ as to make other rnt-mbers of the Islamic Conference advocate 
the lifting of arms embargo towards Bosnia. Although this is not as 
meaningful after the Washington Agre~ment in 1994, since when tbe 
Bosnian army has heen receiving military supplies on a regular basis, for 
Turkey and other Islamic countries tbis is a principle issue which is to 
confirm the right of victims to protect themselves. This is also a way of 
testing the reauiness of tbe Western world to provide support to Moslems 
in their fight. 
However, soon after that it became dear that the great plan of new 
Turkish action was nmning into obstacles.Is 
17 Agreements on Confidence Building and Security Measures (CBSM) were 
reached berween Bulgaria and Turkey in Dct:cmbcr of 1991 and in Novemher of 
1992. They broadened the scope of CBSM given in the Vicuna catalogue. 
18 1\ number of Amerit:ao military analysts pay special aneotions to problems 
Turkey's politics faces in various parts of the world. In Europe Turkey runs into 
obstacles related to its cnl<.:ring lbe EU, which is not to take place very soon. 
An especi:~Jiy difticnlr problem is the Kurd issue. nml th<.:ir dcsirc for sclfdetenni-
n:~tion. Turkish regional position in former Russian-Asian republics is weakeoeu 
by Iruniun und Saudi Arabian activity. Wars from " Yugoslavia to Tadzhikistan 
have made Turkish regional activity in Europe and 1\sia less likely''. See: S.J. 
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In the fo rme r Soviet-As1an r~pubucs Turkish politics bas to compt!tc 
economically with otber Islamic states (Iran), "hich u ffe r a fundamentalist 
approach to religion and tbe development of new rela tions instead of the 
Turkish secula r variant of Is lam. This conflict of secular and fundamental-
ist lsJam i. a part nf a larger connict in Islamic countries and it is re-
flected on Turkey, too. The REFAH party (Prosperity)19 ru a party 
seeking Moslem solidarity and the formation uf a Moslem commonwealth 
of Islamic people, from Mauritania to Dangladesh, is in contlkt with the 
existing concept of Turkish politjcs in whlch entering the European Union 
is still officially domjna ting. A::. this process of joining the European Un-
iun hal\ la,.ted too long not only because of Greek opposition, hul aJsn 
because of the a rtitude of mo t rnem!Jen. of EU, which think that Turkey 
should not he a part of F.urope, radical forces claiming that Turkey need 
not be in Europe and that tbe recent economic succe. se~> cun firm that 
Turkey does not need the EU are becoming stronge r in Turkish politics. 
This cnnf1icl of 1hc sec11lar and the re ligious concept has extended to 
Bosnia-lle rcegovina, where Turkish suppo rt rnccls 1 ha I of o ther Islamic 
countries. Mo ujahedins e nll:rcd the formations of the Bosnian army and 
all thi -; was accompanied by attempts of islam.ization o f Bosnian fighters 
and people. 
Lirnileu ctxmomic resources and the conflict of two Isla mic conccpL" 
wc;1ken rhe possibilities fo r a faster Turkish re lum to the Balkans. The 
truth is that Turkey managed to gel its troop sent to Bosnia withiD the 
U , it maintains close relations with Albania and cunlinut;S to develop 
re lation With Macedonia. However, a new nlliance which would embrace 
aU Serbian cm:mics from Zagreb tO Sarajevo and Tirana and to Skopje 
wa.'> nor estabtished. AJso, Turkey experiences im.Tcru.ing difficulty in defin-
mg its standpoints in the I Iamie cummunity, where other members appear 
to be prOtecting the Bosnian Moslems as well 
One should not forget that Turkey ~ SliU a mt:mber of ATO and 
that American influence i~ fel t in Turkish politics in many respects.ZO It 
is eviuent that Turkey could not independently and without cnntml under-
take any serious action in tbat a rea, e!.-pcdally hee<~use this is a question 
of preserva tion of the fragi le Greek-Turkish relations. The scenarios ac-
Blnok, S.C. Pdlclicrc, W.T . .John!;on, ·n,rkcy's Strategic Positio11 ot tlu: Crossroad~ 
of World Atlaits, Carlislen Barracks, Strutcgic Studies lmnittJic, US Army and 
War Colh:gc, 1993, p. 90-9'1. 
19 P. AviroviC, "The Cballcugc Cullct.l REFAI I: New Actor o n the Turki!>h 
Polilkul Scene'', Balkan JtiJrum, Vol. 2, 3, Septembee 1994, pp. 205-207. 
20 f-or a detailed analy~is of Turkey's foreign politics, as well as foe circum-
~ltiOOCS in wbicb it bas been created, see: G. E . Fuller, "Turkey in the ~ew ln-
tcmational ecurity Environment~. in: F. S. Larrabee (ed.), The; Volatile Powder 
Kt.>g: Blllkuo StX·urity After the Cold War. Wa•;hington, 1991, pp. 135-153. 
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cording to which in case of a broadened conflict in the south of the Bal-
kans the Turkish army would immediately m sh tn help the Moslems in 
Kosovo, Sandiak or in Macedonia are definitely overdramatized. 
With its existing politic-s of getting doser to the Balkans by establishing 
new economic relations and developing military cooperation with AJbania 
:md hy providing assistance for the Bosnian Moslems, it seems that Tur-
key bas done as much as it could.2·1 Other actions which would, for ex-
ample, include a bigger engagement of Turkish military forces in the UN, 
their presence in Bosnia, or their taking part in some crisis in the south 
of the Balkans directly using its militaty resources, exceed the framework 
of Turkish politics. This would be decided on in other places which, of 
course, would have to take lslflmic connections into consideration, but 
would stilJ make decisions depending on broader international interests.22 
Viewed within the framework of international re lations, the Balkans 
presents a good example of a "safety complex"23 , which clearly shows 
that the safety of any Balkan state cannot be achieved separately fom1 
other Balkan states. In terms of models, it is an ideal example of safety 
community which could be, in Deutsch' terminology24 classified as a 
!:,'TOup of slates, alliances or international organizations wb..ich a re geo-
graphically and functi.onally c.onnected, and which open'lte within the mouel 
of conflict and cooperation. 
Analyzecl in tbese term.-; (of conflict and cooperation), the Balkans has 
so far provided different examples with the two taking turns, leaving the 
Balk~LO safety complex as a permanent segment of togetherness. The most 
recent conflict in the Balk<~n area placed the focus in this :mhrcgional 
part of Europe back to a contlict stage with a vague notion of ~· possible 
model for ending the crisis ancl making grounds for cuoperation.2' 
Translated by 
Mima Vadandy-Sapek 
21 A number of American analysts advocates imme.diate Turkey's jo.i.n.ing all 
Western structures (primarily the EU) in oruer to prevent the Moslem involve-
ment in Turkey. Se.e: F.S. Larrabee, Western Strategy wwru·d the Former Yugo-
s/awa., RA D, Santa Monica, 1994, pp. 17-18. 
22 The Turkish prime minister Tensu Ciller emphasize the importance of Tur-
key's role in the Halkan and Cauca.<:ian crisis when she ta lks about "Turkish re-
straint" aud Turkey's desire to act witbin the NATO frumcwork. NATO Rr::vicw, 
2, April , llJ94 , pp. 6. 
23 B. Buzan, People, StaJ:e a.nd Fear, Brighton, 1991 , p. 190. 
2~ K. Deutsch, Politicu/ Communi£y ami thr:: North AtluatJc.: Arr::u, Prim;~:too , 
1957. 
25 Abou! ex.isti11g forms and some pussihility for l:Oop<.:ra.liun on lh<.: Balk!ins 
s~;c: R. Vukauinovic, "Balkau Cooperation: Realities and Prospects'', in: F.S. Lar-
rabee (ed.) , The Volatile Powder Keg, op. ciL, pp. ·185-201. 
